The most significant revision of German policy since World War Two has been carried out in its first year by Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s administration. The upcoming year may be even more challenging, further using Berlin’s bandwidth at the expense of Europe.
Former Finance Minister Scholz entered office promising to continue the policies of Angela Merkel, who managed 16 years of prosperity and stability in the continent’s largest economy, allowing her to assume leadership of the larger area.
Instead, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine tarnished her legacy and drove him to concentrate on re-arming Germany, replacing the cheap Russian energy deliveries on which it depended, and driving a transition in foreign policy towards more strategy and less mercantilism.
Given the diversity of Scholz’s government, the first three-way coalition at the federal level in decades, the “Zeitenwende,” or epochal change of times, has proven to be more difficult.
His center-left Social Democrats, the Greens, and liberal Free Democrats have had to haggle to establish agreements, which occasionally causes decisions to be delayed.
Some European allies claim that Berlin’s attention has been diverted from regional cooperation, particularly the important German-French motor that historically propels the European Union, as a result of the concentration on home issues and internal politics.
When Berlin failed to coordinate its most recent massive economic assistance package with other European cities to prevent market distortions, their resentment reached a boiling point.
A French ambassador noted that, unlike under Merkel, the leaders of France and Germany no longer spoke daily and claimed that Germany appeared to be isolating itself. It’s not good, “And that.”
Scholz’s subtle leadership and communication style, which aids in coalition management but can come across as distant, hasn’t worked.
According to Frank Decker, a political analyst at Bonn University, the government has fared reasonably well in its first year of operation given the scope of the issues. But the issues still exist and will only get worse.
Germany’s capacity to stay warm without Russian gas shipments is already being put to the test by the onset of the cold weather, and prices are not likely to go back to their previous levels.
Next year, a recession is anticipated to hit the German economy. Furthermore, Germany’s traditional free trade, export-driven corporate model will be hampered by the government’s anticipated tougher stance toward its main trading partner China, as well as new US green subsidies.
Scholz’s coalition has avoided substantial social upheaval owing to skyrocketing energy prices in the wake of the Ukraine crisis thanks to relief measures worth hundreds of billions of euros, but recent surveys suggest it has lost its majority.
In his remarks to the German Marshall Fund think tank, Thomas Kleine-Brockhoff stated that “this country is in quest of a new foreign policy stance, in search of a new business model.” And as long as it continues to do that, it will join the group of European nations that are no longer qualified to lead the continent.
MULTIPLE MESSAGES
Undoubtedly, Germany’s partners have welcomed the Zeitenwende after years of cautioning the nation against security complacency.
Days after the invasion of Ukraine, Scholz made a historic speech in which he pledged to increase defence expenditure to NATO’s target of 2% of GDP and broke a taboo rooted in war guilt by committing to send weapons to a conflict zone in support of Kyiv.
Given Ukraine’s terrible Nazi past, a Western official in Berlin who wished to remain anonymous claimed that few people believed Scholz would ever send any weapons there. He stated, “Germany doesn’t receive enough credit for this.”
The diplomat claimed that poor communication was partially to blame. For instance, Berlin made a mocking announcement in January about sending helmets to Ukraine to protect it from a potential invasion, but it didn’t release the entire list of armaments it had delivered until June.
Additionally, the government has been praised for its determination to wean Germany off Russian energy, even if it means shattering political taboos like resurrecting coal power facilities and prolonging the lifespans of the country’s surviving nuclear units.
More recently, U.S. administration officials have given Scholz credit for getting Chinese President Xi Jinping to publicly oppose using or threatening to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine during a visit to Beijing last month.
However, his visit came soon after Xi solidified his hold on power at the Chinese Communist Party Congress, and his choice to allow a Chinese shipping company to invest in a Hamburg port terminal also drew criticism.
According to a second French diplomat, there are concerns that Berlin may be dealing with China in a similar manner to how it handled the security risk posed by China’s excessive reliance on Russian gas.
Some allies are concerned that Germany won’t act swiftly or forcefully enough. A spokeswoman stated this week that the government might not meet its goal for NATO funding until 2025.
Kleine-Brockhoff stated that “this country is recognised for the slowness of change.” “So what appeared to be fine at first contracted the German sickness.”
